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Abstract/presentation 
Although a respected researcher of religion in both the European and North American  
intellectual  scene,  Michel  Despland  is  to  date  still  little  known  in  Brazilian  religion 
studies circles. Among his several publications, we name but a few: Kant on history and 
religion:  with  a  translation  of  Kant's  On  the  failure  of  all  attempted  philosophical 
theodicies (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973); The education of desire, Plato and the 
philosophy of religion (University of Toronto Press, 1985); Les hierarchies sont ebranlees, 
politiques  et  theologies  au  XIXe  siècle,  (Fides,  1998);  Comparatisme  et  Christianisme: 
questions d'histoire et de methode (L'Harmattan, 2002). In the paper before us, which 
was presented during the 12th Symposium of the Brazilian Association for the History of 
Religions (2011, UFJF), Professor Despland starts from the anthropological premise that 
religion  is  “something  people  do”.    Drawing  on  Spinoza’s  work,  Despland  elects  the 
category  of  “superstition”  as  the  most  adequate  tool  for  the  analysis  of  the  religious 
realm,  rather  than,  for  instance,  “the  sacred”.  The  author’s  immediate  goal  is  first  to 
understand Spinoza’s own construal of the religious and political realms in their inter-
relatedness  –  both  in  conceptual  continuity  and  rupture  with  the  Western/Christian 
traditions of political theology. He then proceeds to probe historically into the moral and 
social dimensions of religion as embedded both in its own institutions and in the ever 
growing third realm of civil society vis-à-vis the state. This discussion, enriched by the 
contribution  of  other  important  writers  such  as  J.-J.  Rousseau,  A.  de  Tocqueville,  B. 
Constant and C. Lefort, should serve as a test for his theoretical choices. Despland hopes 
to have shown, at the end, that a consideration of religion as inevitably rooted in human 
nature, together with the analysis of the particular historical configuration of the political 
and religious realms in modern Western civilization, provides us with “a good context for 
the confrontation with some of the fundamental problems of justice that remain before us 
today”. Religion as he sees it, therefore, is  finally to be understood as psychologically and 
historically  contingent  human  action.  All  the  same,  it  takes  place  over  against  the 
irrational-rational  background of some  philosophically resilient categories:  superstition 
and morality.  
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Resumo/apresentação  
Cientista da religião reconhecido e respeitado em ambientes intelectuais da América do 
Norte e da Europa, Michel Despland é ainda pouco conhecido pela academia brasileira. 
Entre  suas  publicações  estão,  por  exemplo:  Kant  on  history  and  religion:  with  a 
translation  of  Kant's  On  the  failure  of  all  attempted  philosophical  theodicies  (McGill-
Queen's  University  Press,  1973);  The  education  of  desire,  Plato  and  the  philosophy  of 
religion (University of Toronto Press, 1985); Les hierarchies sont ebranlees, politiques et 
theologies  au  XIXe  siècle,  (Fides,  1998);  Comparatisme  et  Christianisme:  questions 
d'histoire  et  de  methode  (L'Harmattan,  2002).  No  texto  ora  publicado,  apresentado 
durante o XII Simpósio da Associação Brasileira de História das Religiões (2011, UFJF), o 
prof. Despland assume a premissa antropológica de que “a religião é algo que as pessoas 
fazem.” Baseando-se em Espinosa, Despland elege a categoria da “superstição” como um 
instrumento de análise mais adequado para a análise do religioso do que, por exemplo, a 
do  “sagrado”. O objetivo mais imediato de Despland é primeiramente entender como o 
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próprio  Espinosa  constrói  os  âmbitos  político  e  religioso  em  sua  inter-relação,  em 
continuidade e ruptura com as tradições herdadas da teologia política do Ocidente/do 
cristianismo. A partir daí, ele passa a sondar historiograficamente as dimensões morais e 
sociais da religião diante do Estado, tanto em suas próprias instituições, quanto no cada 
vez mais conspícuo terceiro âmbito da sociedade civil. Esta discussão, enriquecida pelas 
contribuições de outros autores importantes, tais como J.-J. Rousseau, A. de Tocqueville, 
B. Constant e Lefort, deveria servir como teste para as escolhas teóricas do autor. De 
fato,  Despland  espera  ter  começado  a  mostrar,  no  final  de  seu  texto,  que  uma 
consideração da religião como inevitavelmente arraigada na natureza humana, junto com 
a  análise  da  particular  configuração  histórica  dos  âmbitos  político  e  religioso  na 
civilização ocidental-moderna, fornece-nos “um bom contexto para a confrontação com 
alguns dos problemas fundamentais relativos à justiça hoje remanescentes”. A religião, 
assim como ele a vê, há que ser finalmente entendida como ação humana psicológica e 
historicamente contingente. Não obstante, ela ocorre diante do pano de fundo irracional-
racional  de  algumas  categorias  filosoficamente  resilientes,  a  saber:  superstição  e 
moralidade. 
Palavras-chave:  Espinosa;  Religião;  Superstição;  Política;  Sociedade  civil;  História; 
Justiça. 
 
           
 
  This paper is built on an anthropological premise. Religion is something 
people do. (It is also rooted in my conviction that discussions of "the sacred" have 
lost  their  usefulness  in  today's  study  of  religion.)  In  an  attempt  to  reorient 
discussions, I will draw upon a work by Spinoza. The first part will seek to show 
the interest of the notion of superstition advanced by him and give it, if I can, 
scientific  currency.  The  second  part  will  remain  with  Spinoza,  to  show  his 
construction of the religious and the political realms. A third part will move on to 
subsequent and contemporary treatments of theologico-political themes. 
  
  1. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) places a discussion of superstition at the 
beginning  of  his  Theologico-political  Treatise  of  1669  (Spinoza,  2007).  Human 
beings  avidly  desire  worldly  goods  that  are,  by  their  very  nature,  always 
uncertain  and  never  durable.  So  humans  always  hesitate  between  fear  and 
hope.1 Fears make them anxious, hope gives them encouragement and br ings 
some relief. Both arouse passions, stir up the imagination and lend verisimilitude 
to fictions. So human beings, who live in time and move toward an unknown 
future,  become  inevitably  credulous.  Spinoza  states  his  conclusion  firmly: 
humans  are  by  nature  prone  to  superstition.  Superstition  then  is  a  basic, 
enduring  anthropological  category,  not  just  a  convenient  label  for  a  group  of 
behaviours and attitudes. 33 
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  This notion of superstition is a basic part of Spinoza's PHILOSOPHY. His 
pages summarize an argument already made by the philosophers of Antiquity as 
they pondered human destiny. Superstition was seen by them as a moral failure. 
Superstitious  behaviour  is  an  emotional  agitation;  it  is  ridiculous,  shameful. 
Superstitious people are fretful, overexcited; they lose their composure and their 
self-respect. They take all the joy out of religion, writes Plutarch. And, above all, 
superstition  renders  human  beings  impotent.2  When  they  surrender  to  it, 
humans lose the limited measure of power they have over the ir own lives. As a 
contemporary author puts it, "humans are naturally superstitious because they 
cannot be gods" (Breton, 1977, p. 16). 
   
  2. Spinoza adds that we can curb, or, even better, correct this human 
propensity to superstition. And for this he counts on "religion".  
Right away I must emphasize that he does not use what we might call a 
rigorous or scientific conceptualisation of what religion is. In this second part I 
will use the term like him in its common usage, as in Christian or Buddhist 
religion. "Religion" thus means a vague group of phenomena sharing enough of a 
family air to be all commonly called religion. The boundaries of the group remain 
hazy and unclear. "Religion", in this sense, is not claimed to be rooted in human 
nature. It is simply an accepted way of speaking of historical realities, of what 
humans evidence about themselves as they pursue their lives in history. 
To show that religion corrects the human bend to superstition, Spinoza 
examines  the  Scriptures  (Jewish  and  Christian).  He re he leaves  the  field of 
philosophy (strictly speaking) and offers a HERMENEUTIC. He finds in the Bible 
many wonderful stories that appeal to the imagination by telling of admirable 
things. All this is attractive to the multitude and impressive in their eyes. He also 
finds in the prophets of the Old and the apostles of the New Testament moral 
teachings that are very sound. In his eyes, the core teaching of the Bible is moral: 
justice and mercy is what God requires of men. He observes that the apostles 
preached to all and that they spread teachings rather than proclaimed the will of 
God. He stresses in particular that Jesus did not demand obedience but taught 
the truth: God is to be worshipped "from the heart".3 
I cannot accept this view of the biblical cont ents. Moreover his account 
does not fit the record of two millennia of Christian history. I add that his reading 34 
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of the New Testament overlooks a feature of the teaching of Jesus and of the 
apostles that had a novel political significance. Christ ordered his disciples to pay 
the taxes to Caesar, and Paul urged Christians to obey the authorities. But when 
Christ  said  "Render  unto  God  what  belongs  to  God  and  unto  Caesar  what 
belongs to Caesar", he opened up a fresh line of conflict in the Ancient world: 
what belongs to God should not be given to Caesar. In fact within a generation or 
two, early Christians refused to render homage to the emperor as to a god and 
were sentenced to death for that. Pagans noted in amazement this incredible, 
unprecedented behaviour: Christians – and even women! – were dying the death 
of martyrs in the name of their principles.4 
Christian  faith  had  therefore  political  consequences,  by  preparing 
believers  to  resist  all  earthly  powers  on  some  important  points.  (The 
eschatological  temper  of  Early  Christianity  would  encourage  this  readiness.) 
However  when  the  Emperor  Constantine  became  Christian  in  325,  a  vast 
theologico-political synthesis began to take shape. There are, under God, two 
powers on earth, the temporal and the spiritual power , the Emperor and the 
Pope. A huge part of Western history from 500 to 1800 consists in the push and 
pull between these two rival powers. The popes claimed that they received from 
Christ via Saint Peter a universal rule over all, including emperors and kin gs. 
More modestly, the emperors, and after them the kings, claimed only a sovereign 
rule on earth, but claimed this rule was given to them directly by God. Western 
thinkers  spent  centuries  articulating  the  relationship  between  these  two 
contending powers,  each claiming universal scope. This experience of  power 
rivalry between two different kinds of power was uniquely formative for the West. 
We are now equipped with conceptualisations to think of the distinction between 
worldly power and spiritual power, or, using the terms of Napoleon, between the 
sword and the spirit.5 
Starting as early as the 14th century the theological part of the theologico-
political constellation of ideas started weakening. A new social and political force 
was beginning to emerge and was strong enough to set European-wide changes 
in motion. A new idea was gaining currency and force:  civility. A new class of 
people, burgers and  merchants, jurists and humanists, were getting the levers of 
power  in  a  number  of  free  cities  and  small  republics.  The  ideal  of  civil  rule 
became the norm. The new properly civil space was being conquered by pushing 
to  the  margins  two  powers  that  were  predominant  in  the  middle  ages:  the 35 
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nobility, i.e. the feudal lords who lived in fortified castles, had soldiers and could 
raise more troops, and the Church. The monarchies (first among them England 
and France) moved in that direction too. Civil space then was being defined as 
resisting both armed violence and ecclesiastical intrigue.  
The great 17th century treatises in political theory (Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke 
and, later on, Rousseau) drew, in their diverse ways, from the heritage of the 
previous centuries. The era of civil protest had begun as individuals were willing 
to surrender their lives, not in the traditional way by dying on the battlefield in 
the service of a king, but by dying for a civil and just cause and being sentenced 
to  death  in  a  court  of  law.  They  thus  reduplicated  the  acts  of  the  Christian 
martyrs  but,  this  time,  for  a  more  secular  cause.  Thereby  they  imitated  the 
courage of Antigone and of Socrates. Now that moral heroism is apparent also on 
the secular side, the old theologico-political whole begins to fall apart.6 
Nuances must be made. We find in 17 th century Europe two contrasted 
views of civility. During the English Civil War (1642-1651) the idea of civility took 
a clear egalitarian turn. This also happened wherever Calvinist ideas held sway. 
These Protestants challenged both the pope's power, and that of the king. A New 
England theologian stated a firm rule: "all power that is on earth is limited" (John 
Cotton, 1640 apud Hall, 2011, p. 106). But in the Catholic monarchies, most 
notably  those  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  the  idea  of  society  kept  strong 
hierarchical overtones. This was also true in France until the Revolution. But 
after  1789  the  hierarchical  social  structure  as  well  as  its  manners  were 
overthrown  and  society  moved  violently  toward  egalitarianism.  In  time  the 
contest  between  hierarchy  and  equality  appeared  in  all  societies  and  states 
issued from the medieval European matrix. Another violent form of the conflict 
took place in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1938). In Brasil, Sergio Buarque de 
Hollanda  (1902-1982)  found  that  the  idea  of  cordiality  was  stronger  in  his 
country  than  the  idea  of  individualistic  civility.  The  patron-client  relationship 
remained in this case central to the functioning of society.7  
Let us return to Spinoza. As a moralist, he remained firmly in the path 
opened by the philosophers of Antiquity. Philosophy is a school fo r living; as 
Foucault put it, it is a "technique of self" that develops the virtue, that is the 
strength of the person. (While Stoics are known for the call to self -mastery, 
Epicureans  and  others  spoke  more  modestly  of  a  good  use  of  the  world.) 36 
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Maintaining  as  a  philosopher  that  all  individuals  should  strive  to  exercise 
themselves a measure of control over their own life, he belonged to the egalitarian 
pattern. 
Spinoza however also draws the lessons from the millennium of Church-
State conflict in Western Europe to unfold his views on the political realm. 
The  work  of  definition  of  the  political  had  started  with  the  Greek 
philosophers. Aristotle is keen to establish that a city should not be considered 
as just a very large household. In a city there is a wide diversity of activities and 
interests. And there is a constant debate and unceasing deliberation about what 
is just and expedient. Politicians keep speaking of consensus but dissensus is 
the root cause of political activity (Rancière, 1995). Societies can have consensus 
but this is always short-lived. Conflicts of thought, of attitudes and, above all, of 
interests, always threaten to lead to new quarrels. The political system is what 
aims at the management of these conflicts.  
In the days of Spinoza, the State has a new, clear conceptual tool with 
which to legitimate its management of human affairs: the idea of sovereignty. It 
has become widely accepted, pragmatically, that there must always be in human 
societies an absolute and final authority, namely a sovereign authority that can 
settle  issues  and  has  force  at  its  disposal.  This  is  the  new  modern  State, 
sometimes  called  the  Westphalian  State  since  it  emerged  with  the  peace  of 
Westphalia  that  put  an  end  to  the  30-years  war  in  Germany.  A  mosaic  of 
confessional States supports either the Catholic or the Protestant religion. Force 
is the ultimate ground of their power. Ultima Ratio Regis is the motto inscribed 
on  the  guns  of  the  Ancien  Régimes.  The  use  of  the  death  penalty  signals  the 
authority to all. What become called "reason of State" authorises any breach of 
what we now know as human rights.  
Following Hobbes, Spinoza endorses this view of the secular state. But he 
stresses  that  such  state  exercises  its  rule  only  over  bodies.  It  punishes  only 
criminal behaviour. The state, argued Spinoza, must be allowed "to regulate all 
things,  sacred as well  as  profane". Spinoza  gives  however  a  very  firm  limit  to 
such  regulation:  it  is  over  things.  Everyone  is  to  remain  master  of  his  own 
thoughts and free to express them, as he or she sees fit (provided they are not a 
seditious  call  to  arms).  Spinoza  is,  as  always,  a  realist.  How  could  the  state 
control all tongues, when people, at times, can't even control their own?8 37 
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Spinoza ends his Theologico-political Treatise with a piece of RHETORIC. 
He warmly praises the tolerance of the Dutch Government that lets all religious 
groups pursue their affairs as long as they do not break any law. He knows that 
the  Dutch  Republic  is  about  the  only  regime  that  pursues  such  policy.  He 
prudently  avoids  stirring  the  anger  of  French,  English,  Spanish  or  German 
authors who argue against any idea of tolerance. He also published his treatise 
anonymously.  The  reception  proved  his  prudence  was  grounded  in  fact:  the 
treatise was labelled impious.9 
A few years later, John Locke published his famous  Letter on Toleration 
(1686).  He  argues  there  that  the  mark  of  a  true  Church  is  charity  and 
benevolence toward all, including toward those who do not share the faith. Those 
who  hail  his  treatise  usually  forget  to  mention  that  Locke  mentions  two 
exceptions to his rule of toleration. The State should not tolerate either atheists 
or Roman Catholics. The former because their oaths are not credible; the latter 
because  they  hold  an  allegiance  to  a  foreign  monarch.  Churches  should  be 
tolerant, but the State must make exceptions. Sovereignty cannot be divided. The 
Catholic  monarchs  (Portugal  first  among  them)  believed  in  the  same  principle 
when they demanded of the pope to dissolve the Jesuit order (1773).  
 
3.  Important  new  developments  occurred  after  Spinoza  in  what  he 
established  as  the  theologico-political  domain  of  thought.  They  all  have  to  do 
with an assessment of what goes on in the new "civil society" that has taken 
shape in the post medieval society. Society appears as a self ordering whole, in 
which, discussion of ideas and negotiations of interests provide means for the 
organisation of human affairs. Societies are made of a mixture of mores, rules, 
customs  and  ways  of  doing  things.  Discussions  of  Church  and  State  cannot 
proceed  very  far  now,  in  the  abstract,  without  consideration  of  the  historical 
practises in the society where Church and State are to pursue their mission.   
A first, now classical, discussion is found in Rousseau's  Social Contract 
(1762). Born and raised in Geneva, a Republic, he read a wide range of authors 
and  drew  the  implications  for  religion  in  modern  society  by  making  clear 
distinctions  between  three  kinds  of  religion  (Rousseau,  1994  [1762],  book  4, 
chapter 8).  First the religion of man, which has no temples, no altars; it is a 
purely internal cult that individuals render to God and to "eternal moral duties". 38 
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It is the religion Jesus taught. It corresponds to Spinoza's affirmation that each 
human being must both own his or her own soul, and know that he or she does. 
There is also the religion of the priest which is bad because it always seeks to 
make itself into a rival of the State. (Rousseau had in mind the Roman Catholic 
Church but his page should now be read as establishing a sociological type.) To 
these two contrasted religions he adds a third one which is a novel idea: the civil 
religion.10  This  religion does  not  have  many  dogmas  and consists  primarily  in 
"sentiments of sociability". Beside the authority of the rulers exercised vertically 
on  the  people,  Rousseau  acknowledges  the  presence  of  social  customs  that 
exercise  their  authority  horizontally.  Civil  religion,  entrenched  in  ways  of  life, 
teaches mutual tolerance to the citizens and instils in them a love of the laws. 
Thus it feeds the willingness to live together, all being associated in a peaceful 
group.  
This  third  notion  created  a  field  of  inquiry  for  sociologists.  When  de 
Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830ies he saw this civil religion at 
work,  and  argued  that  far  from  enslaving  minds,  this  civil  religion  made  it 
possible  for  democracy  to  work  (Tocqueville,  2002).  The  discussion  of  the 
theologico-political  whole  has  now  moved  much  beyond  discussion  of  Pope 
versus  Emperor  by  including  consideration  of  social  realities,  of  mores  and 
"habits of the heart" (Tocqueville) as they are learned in any given society, and of 
the enduring needs of a stable and decent social life. 
In an important article Claude Lefort (1924-2010) examines the current 
state of the matters discussed by Rousseau and de Tocqueville (Lefort, 1986). He 
can give a long list of 19th century authors (Hegel, de Tocqueville, Auguste Comte) 
who doubted that social morality could remain strong (or that a new one could be 
developed) without a religious flavour, or some sort of religious support. We can 
list today many social and intellectual movements that try all over the globe to 
restore the strength of national identity, by looking for some source of unity, for 
some pole providing a common orientation and thus doing for the society what 
religion used to do. The State, with all its power, appears too pragmatic for that 
stirring of hearts and minds. 
To this empirical observation, Lefort's article adds one large question: is 
theologico-politcal  thinking  really  dead  in  our  secular  age?  Lefort  develops  a 
philosophical argument, based on a major current in the philosophies elaborated 39 
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in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century.  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  human 
insertion into the world? Can we think about the world as if we were not part of 
it? Is our cognitive achievement based only on our placing ourselves in front of 
the world, cutting it and measuring it, while setting aside we are also a part of it? 
Can the subject produce, for instance, theories of superstition, of religion and of 
politics by positing itself as if exterior to all three and detached from them all? 
Our contemporary culture and art is full of vivid expressions of symbolic events. 
Those events that constituted our traditional relationships to the world are still 
around and some new ones are created. Can we accept the rule that all this is to 
remain  private  since  it  is  "subjective"  and  cannot  be  quantified,  or  since  it  is 
either religious or purely poetic? 
Some secularist thinkers today argue just that. In secular society religion, 
they say, must remain private. It can be tolerated if it does not manifest itself in 
the public realm, does not make itself and its views known in the public debate 
on human affairs. It is taken for granted that such visibility would stir fanatical 
passions and give strength to intolerance. But early liberal theories of democracy, 
such  as  found  in  Benjamin  Constant  for  instance,  argued  just  the  opposite. 
Religious  feeling  accompanies  humans  throughout  their  history,  and  religious 
institutions  adapt  themselves  to  the  state  of  civilisation  they  live  in.11  Civil 
society is capable of discussing matters other than the price of beef and sugar. It 
can share thoughts on what human care most about. Institutions that guarantee 
freedom of expression, support literature and the arts can also safely support the 
peaceful expression of all conscientious religious views.12  
To put it bluntly, the point is that politicians should not have a monopoly 
on  discourse  on  the  just  and  the  expedient.  Democratic  politics  are  to  be 
conducted in the open, in sharp contrast to the days when Machiavel advised the 
prince to keep his designs secret (Manent, 1977). Today the political is a major 
part  of  contemporary  life  and  constantly seeks  to persuade  people.  Political  
debates places citizens in front of a rich tapestry of lively symbolic expressions 
that strive to shape the relationship people entertain to the world and to each 
other. This characteristic they share with religion. 
Modern media however have transformed t he practises of rhetoric that 
took for granted that speakers and listeners would stand in the same place, see 
each other and communicate without microphones and speakers. With radio and 40 
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television, propaganda has become a radically new phenomenon. Manipulation of 
images  has  been  taken  to  the  level  of  a  fine  art  and  "sound  bites"  pass  for 
straightforward thinking. Occult financing of political parties makes the views of 
Machiavel  relevant  again.  Who  does  not  see  how  easy  it  is  to  rule  people  by 
fooling them? 13 
This  is  the  point  where  I  can  see  that  thinking  in  theologico-political 
thinking can become relevant. What Spinoza called the religion of the prophets 
and Rousseau the religion of the priests are both institutions that are still here. 
They have members, leaders and articulate spokespersons. They own some real 
estate and can sign checks. They include intellectuals in their ranks. They can 
exert  some  influence  on  the  public  and  social  scene  within  the  rules  of 
democratic debate. They can influence voters. I see here a realistic basis for a 
critical stance toward some of the processes of politics. Denouncing corruptions, 
unveiling of hypocrisies, requiring accountability will give plenty opportunity for 
open, informed criticism and for advocacy of better practices. 
Religious  institutions  can  be  relevant  on  a  second  scene.  States  have 
sovereignty  but  their  power  is  limited  to  a  territory.  The  modern  theories  of 
sovereignty have drawn imaginary lines on the surface of earth. A whole range of 
problems,  from  narco-traffic,  ecological  issues  and  nuclear  clouds,  make  of 
territorial sovereignties an obstacle instead of being a solution. It is noteworthy 
that many religions of priests and prophets have international reach. This is a 
second, positive asset characteristic of these religions. 
There  is  another  side  to  the  coin  of  theologico-political  thinking.  The 
modern  states  claim  the  right  to  punish  leaders  of  prophetic  and  priestly 
churches  who  commit  crimes  and,  in  fact,  they  sometimes  do  judge  them  for 
their crimes. Sexual exploitation of minors by ecclesiastics is probably a very old 
story but it is now becoming exposed and prosecuted. Benedict XVI stated that 
accused priests should be tried in secular courts. This is just part of a broader 
process  of  victims  being  allowed  to  speak.  Equally  difficult  is  the  public 
investigation of the finances of some religious groups where the money of the 
church  and  that  of  the  leader  are  not  kept  distinct.  I  note  that  the  financial 
practises  of  the  Church  of  Scientology  start  being  scrutinised  in  the  United 
States. Consumer protection is thus extended beyond those who sell poisonous 
food  to  the  religious  experts  and  charismatic  figures  who  commit  fraud  and 41 
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exploit credulity to their own very visible and tangible advantage. I admit  that 
police  investigation  of  those  forms  of  criminality  is  very  difficult  and  requires 
educated police.14 
 
To conclude. I hope that my starting point with superstition being rooted 
in human nature, along with the survey of the history of the tensions betwee n 
the theological and the political provides a good context for the confrontation 
with some of the fundamental problems of justice that remain before us today. 
The idea of superstition provides a solid basis of understanding of universal 
human nature. The religious (or theological) and the political take us into realms 
of history, where matters become practical  –  and  where  my  talk  becomes  an 
effort to persuade. In the realms of history things change, and to-morrow need 
not be like today. 
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1 Plato had already said that fear and hope are two imprudent counselors. 
2 See Dale B. Martin (2004),  Inventing Superstition. From the Hippocratics to the Christians. These 
philosophers thought that women are more extreme in their superstitions than men. 
3  This view was also expressed by left-wing Protestants in Holland. Deists also spread the notion of 
Jesus as great moral teacher. Thomas Jefferson wrote an anthology of Gospel texts that went in the 
same direction.  
4 Spinoza stressing that Jesus placed religion in the heart does not notice this.  
5 Defeated and exiled in Saint Helena's island, he affirmed that the spirit will always prevail against 
the sword. 
6 The interest of Spinoza's treatise is that it tries to prolong its life by advancing the view that 
religion must become centered on moral teachings and must be subject to the laws edited by the 
sovereign. The sovereign rules bodies and leaves the minds free to think and free to say what they 
think as long as it is not seditious. 
7 I thank professor Steven Engler for drawing my attention to this point. 
8  Spinoza  (2007, 20)  adds that to legislate against free expression of opinions is no threat to 
criminals, since they keep their thoughts to themselves.   
9  One of Spinoza's friends was condemned for heresy by the synagogue he attended and publicly 
flogged; the young man then committed suicide. Spinoza resigned from the synagogue. Should he 
have argued that flogging a heretic is a crime and that the rabbis that ordered it should have been 
sanctioned? 
10 This idea has roots in views held in Antiquity by Roman thinkers. 
11  B. Constant is the author of five volumes De la religion, considérée dans sa source, ses formes et 
ses développements (Paris, 1824-1831). See Brian Garsten (2009), "Constant on the Religious Spirit 
of Liberalism". Also Helen Rosenblatt (2008), Liberal Values: Benjamin Constant and the Politics of 
Religion. 
12  Truth will be respected when all can f reely attest to what they believe is true. Such is the 
argument  formulated  in  1826  by  Alexandre  Vinet   (1928)  in  Essai  sur  la  manifestation  des 
convictions religieuses. The essay was translated in German. 
13  Spinoza notes that playing upon fears and hopes is   the easiest way for rulers to govern a 
multitude. 
14 A historical footnote may be useful.  There has been an enduring problem among Christians on 
how the Church should be governed. The popes built for the Church monarchical structure parallel 
to that of the   Roman emperors, and, in principle superior. In times of crisis Luther asked the 
protestant princes to be "emergency bishops" for the emerging protestant churches. Calvin however 
built from the bottom up a system whereby the congregations became part of a  larger institution, 
with authority at all levels being the result of votes by all members. The internal governance of 
religious groups should become an important part of all studies of the life of those groups. There is 
likely to be resistance from some be lievers inclined to believe that only enemies of the faith will 
want to know about  the  internal governance of a group. Still I believe  tendencies that favor 
openness are at work everywhere. 
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